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Abstract. In a series of papers, Machery, Mallon, Nichols and Stich critique so-called arguments from reference, 
arguments that assume a theory of reference in order to establish substantive conclusions. The critique is that, due 
to cross-cultural variation in semantic intuitions giving rise to methodological problems in the theory of reference, 
all arguments from reference have an unjustified assumption. I examine an important example of an argument 
from reference, an argument of Churchland’s in support of eliminative materialism. I suggest that extant responses 
to the critique are unsatisfactory, and provide an alternative response: one might justify the assumption of a theory 
of reference in an argument from reference by appealing to an appropriate explication of the relevant common-
sense concepts. 
 
Keywords. Intuitions. Reference. Churchland. Explication. Experimental philosophy. 
1. Introduction 
According to Edouard Machery, Ron Mallon, Shaun Nichols and Stephen Stich (henceforth 
MMNS), arguments from reference are “arguments that derive philosophically significant 
conclusions from the assumption of one or another theory of reference” (Mallon et al. 2009: 
332).  
Here, a theory of reference is a theory that seeks to provide a systematic basis upon 
which worldly items are assigned to some collection of words and phrases, or to the concepts 
they express. We will be concerned with two principal types. First, descriptivist theories of 
reference hold that competent speakers associate reference-fixing descriptions with the 
relevant terms or concepts, and that the referent of a given term or concept is whatever satisfies, 
or comes sufficiently close to satisfying, the relevant reference-fixing descriptions. Second, 
causal-historical theories of reference hold that a term or concept t refers to an entity x just in 
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case there has been an appropriate causal chain of users acquiring t from other users, such that 
the chain began with an initial ‘baptism’ of x. 
According to MMNS, arguments from reference can be found “in nearly every corner 
of philosophy, including the philosophy of mind, the philosophy of science, the philosophy of 
race, and meta-ethics” (Mallon et al. 2009: 332). Herein, I focus on one of their principal 
examples: an argument offered by Paul Churchland (1981) in defence of his eliminative 
materialism.  
Eliminativists propose that mental state terms like ‘belief’ and ‘desire’ are defined by their role 
in […] the folk theory of mind. They assume that if these terms have referents, they must be 
entities that satisfy (or come close to satisfying) the relevant definitions. That is, eliminativists 
assume some version of a descriptivist theory of reference for mental state terms like ‘belief’ 
and ‘desire’. […] Eliminativists claim that the emerging scientific facts suggest that nothing 
satisfies the descriptions folk psychology associates with ‘belief’ and ‘desire’. Thus, ‘belief’ 
and ‘desire’ do not refer [and] beliefs and desires do not exist (Mallon et al. 2009: 334). 
According to MMNS, then, Churchland assumes a descriptivist theory of reference to derive 
the philosophically significant conclusion that beliefs and desires do not exist. 
 MMNS present a general critique of arguments from reference (Machery et al. 2004, 
2013; Mallon et al. 2009). The critique proceeds in three stages. First, MMNS present 
experimental data that, they believe, provide evidence of cross-cultural variation in semantic 
intuitions—and, in particular, cross-cultural variation in intuitions about reference.  
In two separate studies […], we found that Americans were more likely than Chinese to give 
causal-historical responses. […] As we had predicted, Chinese participants tended to have 
descriptivist intuitions, while Americans tended to have [causal-historical] intuitions (Mallon et 
al. 2009: 341) 
Second, MMNS argue that such cross-cultural variation undermines the standard methodology 
used in theorising about reference. They characterise the methodology as follows: 
Although philosophers have rarely been explicit about what the correct method is for 
determining the right theory of reference, they typically appeal to the intuitions of competent 
speakers about the reference of proper names (or other kinds of words) in actual and possible 
cases. […] In practice, philosophers usually appeal only to their own intuitions about reference 
and those of a few colleagues, perhaps because they take these intuitions to be representative of 
competent speakers’ intuitions or perhaps because they take them to be more reliable. (Machery 
et al. 2013: 620) 
3 
 
   
 
And they raise a problem for this methodology along the following lines: 
[T]he evidence suggests that it is wrong for philosophers to assume a priori the universality of 
their own semantic intuitions. […] We find it wildly implausible that the semantic intuitions of 
the narrow cross-section of humanity who are Western academic philosophers are a more 
reliable indicator of the correct theory of reference (if there is such a thing […]) than the 
differing semantic intuitions of other cultural or linguistic groups (Machery et al. 2004: B8–B9) 
Third, MMNS claim that, without an acceptable methodology for theorising about reference, 
the assumption of any particular theory of reference is unjustified. As such, every argument 
from reference has an unjustified assumption. So, according to MMNS, all arguments from 
reference fail. 
The general critique has given rise to a great deal of discussion, which has focused 
around the first and second stages. In light of the first stage, theorists have examined whether 
the available data do in fact support the conclusion that there is cross-cultural variation in 
semantic intuitions; and in light of the second stage, theorists have examined whether cross-
cultural variation would in fact undermine the methodology involved in theorising about 
reference.1 As things currently stand, further experiments have suggested that the evidence in 
favour of cross-cultural variation is reasonably robust, but substantial disagreement remains 
about the consequences for methodology. 
Such responses to the critique, however, may do little to satisfy proponents of 
arguments from reference. For example, Churchland seeks to conclude that there are no beliefs, 
desires, etc. Importantly, this is intended to be a substantial conclusion about human 
psychology. Thus, he states that  
our common-sense conception of psychological phenomena constitutes […] a theory so 
fundamentally defective that both the principles and the ontology of that theory will eventually 
be displaced, rather than smoothly reduced, by completed neuroscience. (1981: 67) 
Such a conclusion, if correct, ought to be independent of whether (a) there is the kind of cross-
cultural variation in semantic intuitions emphasised by MMNS, or (b) such cross-cultural 
variation would undermine methodology for theorising about reference. It is not plausible to 
                                                 
1 For critical discussion of the first stage, see e.g.: Deutsch 2009: 453–457; Lam 2010; Martí 2009; and Sytsma 
and Livengood 2011. For responses, see (respectively): Machery et al. 2015; Machery et al. 2010; Machery et al. 
2009; and Sytsma et al. 2015. For discussion of the second stage, see e.g.: Andow 2014; Deutsch 2009; Devitt 
2011, 2012; Ichikawa et al. 2012; Machery 2012; and Machery et al. 2013. For a recent collection of papers, see 
Haukioja 2015 and, for a more general introduction to the literature, see e.g. Genone 2012 and Hansen 2015. 
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think that such factors as (a) and (b) tell us so directly about mental architecture. What 
Churchland needs, then, is a response to MMNS’s critique that does not take a stand on such 
issues. In particular, he needs to provide an alternative strategy for justifying the assumption 
of a descriptivist theory of reference in his argument from reference: a strategy that does not 
rely on anything like MMNS’s ‘standard’ methodology.  
 The point generalises. All of MMNS’s examples of arguments from reference seek to 
establish substantial conclusions—that scientific knowledge does (or does not) increase, that 
race is (or is not) real, and that ethical knowledge is akin to scientific knowledge—which, on 
the face of it, should be independent of (a) and (b).2 In order to assess the general force of 
MMNS’s critique, we might thus aim to establish whether or not there is a general strategy for 
justifying the assumption of a theory of reference in arguments from reference—a strategy that 
does not rely on anything like MMNS’s ‘standard methodology’. The principal aim of this 
paper is to motivate and develop a strategy—which we may call the explication strategy— 
along these lines. 
As already indicated, I focus throughout on Churchland’s argument from reference. 
The reason for this is twofold. First, as the devil will inevitably be in the detail, it is instructive 
to see the how the details of the explication strategy can be worked out in at least one particular 
case. Churchland’s argument from reference is an ideal case if only because it is reasonably 
well-known. Second, as I argue below, there is at least one way of interpreting Churchland’s 
argument from reference on which the explication strategy provides a natural response to 
MMNS’s critique. Spelling this out will serve as a motivation for the explication strategy more 
generally.  
2. Churchland’s argument from reference 
Churchland’s argument from reference is offered in favour of his eliminative materialism, the 
view that the common-sense mental-state concepts (of belief, desire, etc.) are theoretical 
concepts of an empirical theory, folk psychology, that is radically false and whose ontology 
will ultimately be replaced. Its structure is as follows. 
 
(P1) The common-sense mental-state concepts are theoretical concepts of folk psychology. 
                                                 
2 See Mallon et al. 2009: 333–337. 
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(P2) Contemporary science shows that it is a serious possibility that folk psychology is 
radically false. 
(C) It is a serious possibility that there are no beliefs, desires, etc. 
 
Here, folk psychology is to be understood as a system of laws, amongst which are those that 
connect up external conditions with mental states (such (1)), those that govern mental states 
(such as (2)), and those that connect up mental states with actions (such as (3)). 
 
(1) For all x, y: if x is facing y and y is unobstructed, then (ceteris paribus) x is aware of y. 
 
(2) (i) For all x, p: if x fears p, then (ceteris paribus) x desires not-p. 
(ii) For all x, p, q: if x believes p and x believes [p implies q], then (ceteris paribus) 
x believes q.  
 
(3) For all x, p, φ: if both x desires p, and x believes that φing will bring about that p, then 
(ceteris paribus) x will φ.  
 
The theoretical concepts of folk psychology are just the concepts expressed by the non-logical 
vocabulary in such laws.  
As mentioned above, Churchland’s argument assumes that the theoretical concepts of 
folk psychology have their referents fixed descriptively, with the laws of folk psychology 
acting as the reference-fixing descriptions. It is only with this assumption that the radical falsity 
of folk psychology suffices to establish that there are no beliefs, desires, etc. (For example: our 
uses of the theoretical terms of folk psychology might stand at the end of appropriate causal-
historical chains, at the other end of which are successful baptisms, even if the laws of folk 
psychology are radically false of whatever was baptised.) 
It is worth noting that the argument does not assume what we might call a strict 
descriptivist theory of reference. That is, the argument does not assume that, for the theoretical 
concepts of folk psychology to have referents at all, the reference-fixing descriptions must be 
perfectly satisfied. The strength of (P2)—which suggests that folk psychology may well be 
radically false—allows for some leeway: the reference-fixing descriptions need only be 
satisfied to a sufficiently high degree. Thus Churchland’s argument assumes that the concepts 
of folk psychology will refer so long as there are some internal states that come sufficiently 
close to satisfying the laws of folk psychology—whether or not they satisfy those laws 
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perfectly. The alleged radical falsity of folk psychology is then intended to warrant the 
inference that the theoretical concepts of folk psychology are empty. 
Churchland summarises his defence of (P1) as follows. 
Seeing our common-sense conceptual framework for mental phenomena as a theory brings a 
simple and unifying organization to most of the major topics in the philosophy of mind, 
including the explanation and prediction of behavior, the semantics of mental predicates, […] 
the other-minds problem, the intentionality of mental states, the nature of introspection, and the 
mind-body problem. Any view that can pull this lot together deserves careful consideration. 
(1981: 68). 
I will discuss some of these aspects of the ‘simple and unifying organisation’ presently. 
Churchland defends (P2) by arguing  
that folk psychology suffers explanatory failures on an epic scale, that is has been stagnant for 
at least twenty-five centuries, and that its categories appear (so far) to be incommensurable with 
or orthogonal to the categories of the background physical science whose long-term claim to 
explain human behavior seems undeniable. (p. 76) 
As (P2) will not concern us in what follows, I put Churchland’s defence of it aside. See his 
1981 (pp. 72–76) for more details. 
 Focus now on Churchland’s defence of (P1). Notice immediately that Churchland 
offers us neither a linguistic argument, nor a form of conceptual analysis; he does not provide 
linguistic evidence that “belief”, “desire”, etc., act like theoretical terms, nor does he seek to 
analyse in any obvious sense the everyday concepts of belief, desire, etc. Rather, he points to 
certain theoretical benefits obtained by thinking of the familiar mental-state terms and concepts 
as the theoretical terms and concepts of folk psychology. 
 As Churchland is typically understood, his specific aim here is to argue that the folk in 
fact possess the theoretical concepts of folk psychology—deploying them when common-
sensically explaining or predicting actions, and expressing them with ordinary, run of the mill 
uses of “belief”, “desire”, etc.  However, I want to suggest an alternative interpretation of 
Churchland’s defence of (P1), as a kind of Carnapian explication.3 To be clear, the suggestion 
is not that, somewhat surprisingly, Churchland has always intended his argument to be 
interpreted as a kind of Carnapian explication. Rather, the suggestion is that the specifics of 
                                                 
3 See Carnap 1950. I note in advance that nothing that follows depends on the details of Carnap’s ‘metaontological’ 
views. 
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Churchland’s argument, if not the surrounding text, lend themselves to the alternative 
interpretation. And, as we will see, interpreting Churchland’s defence of (P1) as a kind of 
Carnapian explication will help us respond to MMNS’s critique of arguments from reference. 
Let me say a little more about explications. I take an explication to be a stipulated 
refinement, or precisification, of certain pretheoretic (or otherwise imprecise) concepts, 
typically to facilitate subsequent theorising. Following Carnap, I will call the refined concept 
(or the corresponding term) the explicatum, and the pretheoretic or imprecise concept (or the 
corresponding term) the explicandum.  
Explications are stipulative: an explicatum is not intended to describe the explicandum, 
nor to make explicit its satisfaction conditions or encode its ordinary usage, etc.; rather, the 
explicatum is offered as a theoretical counterpart to the explicandum. When theorising, so goes 
the thought, one ought to use the explicatum rather than the explicandum. Thus, while 
explications are not true or false, there may nonetheless be good explications and bad 
explications. Whether an explication is good will depend on a variety of factors. For Carnap, 
the following three factors are the most important.  
 
(I) The explicatum should be precise.  
(II) The explicatum should be similar in relevant respects to the explicandum. 
(III) The explicatum should be a fruitful concept. 
 
A few brief comments. I interpret (I) as telling us that the more precisely defined an explicatum, 
the better it is.4 Following Carnap, I take the similarity demanded by (II) to be loose, and I take 
                                                 
4 An anonymous referee for this volume points out that this criterion is ‘risky’, as we can make an explicatum 
more precise by stipulating a theory of reference for it (a claim I rely on below). The issue arises with the 
stipulation of a descriptivist theory of reference: the more precise the reference-fixing descriptions, the more likely 
it is that our descriptions will go unsatisfied and our explicatum will be empty. In part because of such concerns, 
I suspect that criterion (I) should ultimately be amended: we would typically like an explicatum to exhibit an 
‘appropriate level’ of precision relative to our background theory and knowledge. For example, the explicatum 
given below for planet is certainly not maximally precise, in part because there is no precise account of when a 
celestial object should count as having cleared its orbit of debris. But, until we have developed theories that rely 
on particular precisifications, or until we have observed the orbits of a greater range of candidate planets, it would 
be undesirable to arbitrarily precisify the explicatum: relative to our current cosmological theory and knowledge, 
the explicatum of planet is appropriately precise—and, in that particular case, the appropriate level of precision 
is not ‘risky’ in the relevant sense. Regardless, as the principal aim of this paper does not rely on the particular 
choice of criteria for a good explication, for present purposes I adopt Carnap’s criterion (I) as it stands. 
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the relevance to be dependent on the specific explicandum; I will deem (II) to be satisfied if 
the theoretically relevant, salient features of the explicandum are shared by the explicatum. 
And, following Philip Kitcher’s treatment of explication (2008: 115), I take the fruitfulness 
required by (III) to be a matter of how many theoretical questions and problems the explicatum 
helps us to resolve, perhaps weighted by their importance.  
For example, consider the concept of planet.5 Until recently, there was no agreed upon 
definition—merely nine canonical instances. Then, in 2006, the International Astronomical 
Union explicated the concept, refining it so as to provide a better taxonomy of celestial objects. 
A planet was henceforth to be an object such that: it orbited a star but did not orbit another 
planet; it was large enough for gravity to have formed it into a sphere but not large enough for 
its gravity to trigger fusion; and it had cleared its orbit of debris. Here, the explicandum is the 
pre-2006 concept, with its nine canonical instances; and the explicatum is the refined concept 
with its tripartite satisfaction condition.  
The explication of the concept planet plausibly satisfies (I)–(III). First, given that the 
explicatum is more precise than the explicandum, we might plausibly claim that (I) is satisfied. 
Similarly, (II) is plausibly satisfied: the most salient features of the explicandum are its nine 
canonical instances, eight of which—all except Pluto—fall under the explicatum. Finally, 
insofar as the explicatum provides a more unified cosmological kind than the explicandum, the 
explicatum is more likely to facilitate successful problem solving. So we might plausibly hope 
that, in due course, we will find that (III) is also satisfied. Plausibly, then, the IAU’s explication 
of the concept planet is a good explication. 
Turn back to Churchland’s defence of (P1). We can interpret that defence as seeking to 
justify the following: 
 
(4) The common-sense mental-state concepts (such as belief, desire, etc.) are to be 
explicated, and the explicata are the theoretical concepts of folk psychology. 
 
To see how this works, let me go through Churchland’s discussion of three aspects of the 
‘simple and unifying organisation’ that are brought to the philosophy of mind: the semantics 
of mental predicates; the explanation and prediction of behaviour; and the other-minds 
problem. 
                                                 
5 I roughly follow Ludlow’s (2014: 41ff) discussion here, although Ludlow is concerned with meaning modulation 
rather than explication.    
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 First, consider the semantics of mental predicates. Churchland states that 
the semantics of the terms in our familiar mentalistic vocabulary is to be understood in the same 
manner as the semantics of theoretical terms generally: the meaning of any theoretical term is 
fixed or constituted by the network of laws in which it figures. (1981: 69) 
One key thought here is that we can straightforwardly give a semantics for theoretical terms, 
perhaps in terms of the network of laws in which those terms figure. This suggests that those 
theoretical terms, and the concepts they express, are reasonably precise, in the sense that we 
can provide conditions for correct application. For Churchland, then, the theoretical terms and 
concepts of folk psychology, qua explicata, go some way towards satisfying (I). 
 Second, consider the explanation and prediction of behaviour. 
The fact is that the average person is able to explain, and even predict, the behavior of other 
persons with a facility and success that is remarkable. Such explanations and predictions 
standardly make reference to the desires, beliefs, fears, intentions, perceptions, and so forth, to 
which the agents are presumed subject. But explanations presuppose laws—rough and ready 
ones, at least—that connect the explanatory conditions with the behavior explained. The same 
is true for the making of predictions […]. Reassuringly, a rich network of common-sense laws 
can indeed be reconstructed from the quotidian commerce of explanation and anticipation; its 
principles are familiar homilies; and their sundry functions are transparent. Each of us 
understands others, as well as we do, because we share a tacit command of an integrated body 
of lore concerning the law-like relations holding among external circumstances, internal states, 
and overt behavior. (1981: 68–69) 
At the beginning of this passage, Churchland points to a distinctive feature of the common-
sense mental-state concepts, viz. that they are deployed in our everyday explanations and 
predictions of behaviour. Such explanations and predictions, Churchland claims, presuppose 
(perhaps rough and ready) laws that connect up the ‘explanatory conditions’ with the 
‘behaviour explained’. In the present case, the presupposed laws will connect up: (a) the 
conditions under which our ordinary explanations and predictions of behaviour are given; with 
(b) the relevant actions of other people. As is made clear at the end of the passage, the laws 
that underpin our everyday explanations and predictions of behaviour connect (a) and (b) via 
internal states. 
 There are two important ideas here: first, it is a distinctive feature of the common-sense 
mental-state concepts that they are deployed in everyday explanations and predictions of 
behaviour; and, second, such explanations and predictions are underpinned by a ‘tacit 
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command’ of laws that connect up external conditions with internal states and that connect up 
internal states with actions.  
 Folk psychology reflects these two ideas. First, the theoretical concepts of folk 
psychology feature in a set of laws—such as those in (1)–(3)—that underpin explanations and 
predictions of behaviour comparable to our everyday explanations and predictions of 
behaviour. As such, the distinctive feature of the common-sense mental-state concepts—that 
they are deployed in everyday explanations and predictions of behaviour—is reflected by the 
theoretical concepts of folk psychology. Second, the laws that underpin such explanations and 
predictions do not tie (a) to (b) directly, but do so via internal states. Thus, in this respect, the 
theoretical concepts of folk psychology, qua explicata, go some way towards satisfying (II). 
 Third, consider the other minds problem. 
The problematic conviction that another individual is the subject of certain mental states is not 
inferred deductively from his behavior, nor is it inferred by inductive analogy from the 
perilously isolated instance of one’s own case. Rather, that conviction is a singular explanatory 
hypothesis of a perfectly straightforward kind. Its function, in conjunction with the background 
laws of folk psychology, is to provide explanations/predictions/understanding of the 
individual’s continuing behavior […]. Knowledge of other minds thus has no essential 
dependence on knowledge of one’s own mind. Applying the principles of folk psychologising 
to our behavior, a Martian could justly ascribe to us the familiar run of mental states, even 
though his own psychology were very different from ours. (1981: 69) 
As I understand Churchland, he here takes the key challenge posed by the problem of other 
minds to be to explain how knowledge of other minds (i.e. knowledge that another agents 
believes, desires, etc.) is in principle possible—without appealing to ‘deduction from 
behaviour’ or ‘induction from the perilously isolated instance of one’s own case’. Now, from 
the perspective of folk psychology, it is natural to construe ascriptions of mental states as 
explanatory hypotheses. And, importantly, such hypotheses can be confirmed if the 
explanations and predictions they provide are sufficiently successful.6 Thus, from the 
perspective of folk psychology, one plausibly obtains the following important consequence. 
 
                                                 
6 For Churchland, of course, those explanations and predictions are in fact not sufficiently successful. The point 
is that, in principle, were those explanations and predictions sufficiently successful then one could come to know 
that another agent has beliefs and desires. 
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(5) In principle, our everyday explanatory and predictive practices could lead to knowledge 
of others’ minds (i.e. knowledge that another agent believes, desires, etc.). 
 
Thus, in this sense, the theoretical concepts of folk psychology are fruitful: they facilitate the 
resolution of theoretical problems in the philosophy of mind. That is, they plausibly satisfy 
(III). 
 Other aspects of Churchland’s defence of (P1) can be construed similarly—in 
particular, as supporting the conclusion that the theoretical concepts of folk psychology, qua 
explicata, satisfy (III)—although for brevity I do not discuss those aspects here. 
Churchland’s defence of (P1) is naturally interpreted as a defence of an explication of 
the common-sense concepts of belief, desire, etc., viz. that they should be explicated using the 
theoretical concepts of folk psychology. If the argument (so construed) is right, then for 
theoretical purposes we should henceforth treat such terms as “belief”, “desire”, etc., as 
theoretical terms of folk psychology.  
Given this explication, we can understand (P1) so that it follows trivially. If Churchland 
is within a theoretical context, then he should treat the common-sense mental-state concepts as 
the theoretical concepts of folk psychology: the latter act as straightforward replacements for 
the former. The premise (P1) can be interpreted as making explicit this commitment. 
To be clear, MMNS’s critique does not extend to (P1), so construed. As I have 
characterised the premise, it is justified by an explication. Here, however, explications are 
stipulative: a good explication is not in any sense ‘true’, need not adhere to everyone’s 
intuitions, and, in particular, does not depend on an acceptable methodology for theorising 
about reference. One would not undermine this defence of (P1) by presenting empirical 
evidence that there is cross-cultural variation in intuitions about theoretical terms or about the 
concepts of belief, desire, or anything similar. 
3. A response to MMNS’s critique 
We can understand (P1) as making explicit an explication—where explications are not affected 
by the kind of methodological concerns raised by MMNS. As such, if we interpret 
Churchland’s argument as I have suggested, the following strategy for responding to MMNS’s 
critique emerges: one might subsume the assumption of a descriptivist theory of reference 
under (P1). That is, one might begin by replacing (P1) with the following: 
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(P1′) The common-sense mental-state concepts are (to be explicated by the) theoretical 
concepts of folk psychology whose extensions are fixed descriptively. 
 
Then, one might extend the original defence of (P1) to support the new (P1′). In particular, one 
might argue for an explication of the common-sense concepts of belief, desire, etc., such that 
the explicata are the theoretical concepts of folk psychology construed descriptively. As 
explications are stipulative, such a defence of (P1′) will be unaffected by MMNS’s 
methodological concerns. 
 There is a slight complication. As it stands, (P1′) does not suffice for Churchland’s 
purposes. The issue is that (P1′) does not specify which descriptions serve to fix the referents 
of the terms of folk psychology. Churchland assumes that the reference-fixing descriptions are 
the laws of folk psychology—so that, for example, the terms satisfy:  
 
(6) For theoretical concepts of folk psychology x1, …, xn: x1, …, xn only refer if some 
internal states s1, …, sn come sufficiently close to satisfying the folk psychological laws, 
in which case xi refers to si.
7 
 
On this assumption, the radical falsity of folk psychology implies that there are no beliefs, 
desires, etc.8 However, one could endorse (P1′) while denying (6). For example, one might 
claim that each concept of folk psychology is to be associated with a single description—
perhaps ‘the state of holding a proposition true’ for the concept belief, and ‘the state of 
preferring a proposition to be true’ for desire, and so on. Call that single description 
descriptivism. Now, folk psychology could be radically false even if there are bona fide states 
of holding a proposition true and preferring a proposition to be true: it is at least a possibility 
that there are states of holding a proposition true, preferring a proposition to be true, etc., which 
do not come close to satisfying the laws of folk psychology. Thus, the assumption of a 
descriptivist theory of reference per se is not sufficient for Churchland’s argument from 
reference; the assumed theory of reference must be (6), or something very much like it. 
                                                 
7 I make the simplifying assumption throughout that, if there are states that come ‘sufficiently’ close to satisfying 
the laws of folk psychology, then those states come closest to satisfying the laws of folk psychology. 
8 Assume (6). Now, suppose that there are beliefs, desires, etc. Then, by (6), beliefs, desires, etc., come 
‘sufficiently’ close to satisfying the laws of folk psychology; and so the laws of folk psychology are not radically 
false; and so folk psychology is not radically false. By contraposition, we obtain: if folk psychology is radically 
false, then there are no beliefs, desires, etc. 
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 As such, one should seek to respond to MMNS’s critique by replacing (P1) with the 
following premise: 
 
(P1′′) The common-sense mental-state concepts are (to be explicated by the) theoretical 
concepts of folk psychology whose extensions are fixed descriptively by the laws of 
folk psychology. 
 
One might then extend the original defence of (P1) to support the new (P1′′), by arguing for an 
explication of the common-sense concepts of belief, desire, etc., such that the explicata are the 
theoretical concepts of folk psychology construed so that (6) is satisfied. 
 As I construed Churchland’s defence of (P1), it aimed to justify explicating the 
common-sense mental-states concepts in accordance with (4). Here are five ways to precisify 
(4): 
 
(7) (i) The common-sense mental-state concepts (such as belief, desire, etc.) are to be
 explicated; the explicata are the theoretical concepts of folk psychology, where
 it is stipulated that the extensions of the concepts of folk psychology are to be
 fixed descriptively, and it is stipulated that  the reference-fixing descriptions are
 the laws of folk psychology. 
(ii) The common-sense mental-state concepts (such as belief, desire, etc.) are to be 
explicated; the explicata are the theoretical concepts of folk psychology, where 
it is stipulated that the extensions of the concepts of folk psychology are to be 
fixed descriptively, and a single description is supplied for each concept. 
(iii) The common-sense mental-state concepts (such as belief, desire, etc.) are to be 
explicated; the explicata are the theoretical concepts of folk psychology, where 
it is stipulated that the extensions of the concepts of folk psychology are to be 
fixed descriptively, but it is not stipulated what the reference-fixing descriptions 
are. 
(iv) The common-sense mental-state concepts (such as belief, desire, etc.) are to be 
explicated; the explicata are the theoretical concepts of folk psychology, where 
it is stipulated that the extensions of the concepts of folk psychology are to be 
fixed causal-historically. 
(v) The common-sense mental-state concepts (such as belief, desire, etc.) are to be 
explicated; the explicata are the theoretical concepts of folk psychology, where 
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it is not stipulated how the extensions of the concepts of folk psychology are to 
be fixed. 
 
If one can justify (7i), then one can justify (P1′′). Otherwise, not. In what follows I extend 
Churchland’s arguments, yielding arguments that (7i) is a better explication than (7ii–v). 
 To begin, then, recall (I): an explicatum should be precise. I submit that one way of 
making an explicatum precise is to stipulate how its extension is fixed. For example, consider 
the case of the concept planet. Suppose that the IAU had the following two candidate explicata: 
 
(8) (i) The concept planet1 is defined by φ, or has sense φ, or has stereotype φ, etc.,
 and the extension of planet1 is fixed descriptively as whatever satisfies, or
 comes sufficiently close to satisfying, φ. 
(ii) The concept planet2 is defined by φ, or has sense φ, or has stereotype φ, etc., 
but it is not stipulated precisely how the extension of planet2 is fixed. 
 
where “φ” abbreviates the tripartite condition developed by the IAU, viz. orbiting a star but not 
a planet, having an appropriate size, and having cleared its orbit. The concept planet1 is more 
precise than the concept planet2 in the sense that, relative to some (epistemically possible) state 
of the world, the extension planet1, but not of planet2, is fixed. When we use “planet1”, we talk 
about those objects that satisfy φ; when we use “planet2”, it is unclear whether we are talking 
about (say) the objects that satisfy φ, the objects that satisfy some other description, or the 
objects that are conspecific with those that are typically called “planet2”, or something else. All 
else being equal, an explicatum is more precise if one has stipulated how its extension is fixed. 
 Now, (7i), (7ii) and (7iv) stipulate how the extensions of the explicata are fixed; but 
(7iii) and (7v) do not. In particular, (7iii) remains neutral on which descriptions fix the 
extensions, and (7v) remains neutral on what kind of mechanism fixes the extensions. In light 
of (I), then, (7i), (7ii) (7iv) are better explications than (7iii) and (7v).  
 So which of (7i), (7ii) and (7iv) is the better explication? Recall the earlier discussions 
of explanation and prediction of behaviour and of the problem of other minds. I will now argue 
that those two discussions can be extended to support the claim that (7i) is the better 
explication.  
 First, recall the discussion of explanation and prediction of behaviour. I presented an 
argument that the theoretical concepts of folk psychology are similar to our common-sense 
mental-state concepts in the following important respect: it is a distinctive feature of the 
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common-sense mental-state concepts that they are deployed in everyday explanations and 
predictions of behaviour, and the theoretical concepts of folk psychology feature in laws that 
underpin comparable explanations and predictions of behaviour.  
 Now, this distinctive feature of the common-sense mental-state concepts is preserved 
by (7i) but not by (7ii) or (7iv). Suppose that we treat the terms and concepts of folk psychology 
as though their extensions are fixed descriptively by the laws of folk psychology. Then, any 
competent user of those terms and concepts will grasp the laws of folk psychology, and will be 
able to use those terms and concepts to connect up the external conditions with internal states 
on the one hand, and internal states with an agent’s actions on the other. Such a user would 
thus be able to explain and predict behaviour in the ordinary manner.  
Suppose instead that we treat the terms and concepts of folk psychology as either: 
having extensions fixed by single descriptions; or having extensions fixed causal-historically. 
Then, competence with those terms and concepts does not require one to grasp the laws of folk 
psychology, but rather to grasp either single descriptions for each concept or to stand at the end 
of appropriate causal-historical chains. As such, a competent user of those terms might neither 
be able to connect up internal states with external conditions on the one hand, nor be able to 
connect up internal states with an agent’s behaviour on the other. To explain how such users 
explain and predict behaviour in the ordinary manner, we would have to attribute to them an 
independent belief in the laws of folk psychology. 
These considerations provide support for explicating the common-sense mental-state 
concepts in accordance with (7i) rather than (7ii) or (7iv). Consider (II): explicata should be 
similar in relevant respects to the explicanda. For Churchland, a distinctive feature of the 
explicanda—the common-sense mental-state concepts—is that they are deployed in everyday 
explanations and predictions of behaviour. The explicata—the theoretical concepts of folk 
psychology—themselves support comparable explanation and prediction of behaviour, only if 
they are construed descriptively with the laws of folk psychology acting as the reference-fixing 
descriptions. If the explicata are construed in terms of single description descriptivism or the 
causal-historical theory of reference, then the explicata would require supplementation with 
the laws of folk psychology in order to support the relevant explanations and predictions. So, 
given (7i), the explicata per se capture this distinctive feature of the explicanda (viz. that they 
are deployed in everyday explanations and predictions of behaviour). But, given (7ii) and (7iv), 
the explicata per se do not. In this respect, then, (II) supports (7i) over (7ii) and (7iv).  
In addition, I note that criterion (III)—that explicata should be fruitful concepts—
provides support for (7i). We have just seen that the concepts of folk psychology without 
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supplementation support the explanation and prediction of behaviour only when they are 
construed descriptively with the laws of folk psychology acting as the reference-fixing 
descriptions. Thus, in at least this respect, the concepts of folk psychology are more fruitful if 
they are so construed, rather than in terms of single description descriptivism or the causal-
historical theory of reference. 
Second, turn to Churchland’s discussion of the problem of other minds. The challenge, 
recall, was to explain how knowledge of other minds is in principle possible without appealing 
to ‘deduction from behaviour’ or ‘induction from the perilously isolated instance of one’s own 
case’. From the perspective of folk psychology, this challenge appeared to be easily met: 
ascriptions of mental states are hypotheses that would in principle be confirmed, were the 
explanations and predictions supported by those ascriptions sufficiently successful. Thus, (5), 
reprinted here, is an important consequence of this approach.  
 
(5) In principle, our everyday explanatory and predictive practices could lead to knowledge 
of others’ minds (i.e. knowledge that another agent believes, desires, etc.). 
 
However, this response to the problem of other minds relies on the assumption that the 
theoretical concepts of folk psychology are construed descriptively, with the laws of folk 
psychology acting as the reference-fixing descriptions. 
 First, suppose that the concepts of folk psychology are indeed construed descriptively 
with the laws of folk psychology acting as reference-fixing descriptions. On such a view, the 
ascription of mental states is simply the hypothesis that the agent has some internal states that 
(to a sufficient) degree satisfy the laws of folk psychology. Now, in principle, this hypothesis 
could be confirmed by our everyday explanatory and predictive practices: if those explanations 
and predictions are sufficiently successful—something which Churchland denies—, then one 
would be entitled to infer that there are indeed internal states that satisfy the laws that underpin 
those explanations and predictions. Thus, in principle, one could come to know that an agent 
is subject to states that satisfy the laws of folk psychology. And, given the supposition that the 
laws of folk psychology are reference-fixing descriptions, one could thus come to have 
knowledge that others have beliefs, desires, etc. 
 Suppose now that the concepts of folk psychology are construed descriptively, in terms 
of single description descriptivism. Then (5) does not follow from Churchland’s account of the 
problem of other minds. The success of our everyday explanations and predictions of behaviour 
can only confirm that there are some (nonspecific) states that come sufficiently close to 
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satisfying the underlying laws, not that the particular states of ‘holding a proposition true’, 
‘preferring a proposition to be true’, etc., come sufficiently close to satisfying those laws. That 
is, assuming single description descriptivism, it is a possibility that: the laws of folk psychology 
are radically false because the states of ‘holding a proposition true’, ‘preferring a proposition 
to be true’, etc., do not come close to satisfying the laws of folk psychology; but, nonetheless, 
the explanations and predictions underpinned by folk psychology are highly successful because 
there are other internal states of agents that do come close to satisfying the laws of folk 
psychology. But then, our everyday explanatory and predictive practices would not lead to 
knowledge agents have beliefs, desires, etc.: however successful those practices, one would 
not be entitled to infer that an agent was subject to the familiar mental states. 
 The problem carries over mutatis mutandis on the supposition that the concepts of folk 
psychology are construed causal-historically: the success of our everyday explanatory and 
predictive practices could only lead to knowledge that some states come sufficiently close to 
satisfying the laws of folk psychology, not that the particular states that stand at the beginning 
of the relevant causal-historical chains come close to satisfying the laws of folk psychology. 
As such, however successful our explanatory and predictive practices, one would not be 
entitled to conclude that an agent has beliefs, desires, etc. 
 Churchland’s treatment of the problem of other minds, then, relies on construing the 
concepts of folk psychology descriptively, with the laws of folk psychology acting as 
reference-fixing descriptions. In at least this respect, the concepts of folk psychology are more 
fruitful if they are so construed, rather than in terms of single description descriptivism or the 
causal-historical theory of reference. Given (III), this is additional support for explicating the 
common-sense mental-state concepts in accordance with (7i), rather than in accordance with 
(7ii) or (7iv). 
 If the foregoing is right, then there are arguments available that support explicating the 
common-sense mental-state concepts descriptively, with the laws of folk psychology acting as 
the reference-fixing descriptions. But, then, (P1′′) follows trivially. If one is within a theoretical 
context, then, given (7i), one should treat the terms of the familiar mentalistic vocabulary as 
theoretical terms of folk psychology construed descriptively. The premise (P1′′) can be 
understood so as to merely make this commitment explicit. 
This alternative formulation of Churchland’s argument avoids MMNS’s critique. The 
assumption of a theory of reference (which is explicit in (P1′′)) is justified by an explication of 
the familiar mental-state concepts. There are independent arguments available to Churchland 
that the explication is, by the lights of (I), (II), (III), a good explication. However, as 
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explications are stipulative, they are not affected by concerns about the methodology involved 
in theorising about reference. That is, the soundness of the alternative formulation of 
Churchland’s argument from reference depends neither upon whether there is cross-cultural 
variation in semantic intuitions nor upon whether such variation undermines the standard 
methodology for theorising about reference. 
4. Two objections 
Objection one. “The alternative argument from reference does not establish Churchland’s 
intended conclusion. Churchland is concerned to show that it is a serious possibility that there 
are no beliefs, desires, etc., in the ordinary sense of those terms. The alternative argument from 
reference, in making use of explicata rather than explicanda, cannot establish this conclusion.” 
 Reply one. The objection misses its mark. My aim has been to provide an interpretation 
of Churchland’s argument from reference that illustrates how explications can be used in 
defence of arguments from reference, rather than to defend Churchland per se. Nonetheless, 
there is an important objection in this area, as follows: “what is really interesting about this 
issue is whether there are beliefs, desires, etc., in the ordinary sense of those terms. The 
alternative argument from reference, in making use of explicata rather than explicanda, does 
not speak to this issue.” 
Let me briefly sketch my response to this objection. It is far from clear that, with their 
ordinary senses, the concepts of belief, desire, etc., are appropriate for serious theoretical 
inquiry into the mental architecture of humans. In any field of research in which linguistic 
precision is required, explication (or something like it) is required: our ordinary discourse is 
not sufficiently precise, unified or widespread to facilitate careful theorising. For example, it 
is not appropriate for cosmologists to discuss planets ‘in the ordinary sense of the term’; nor 
for physicists to discuss mass ‘in the ordinary sense of the term’; nor for economists to talk 
about markets ‘in the ordinary sense of the term’; nor for mathematicians to talk about infinity 
‘in the ordinary sense of the term’; etc. I think that we should be highly sceptical of the claim 
that it is appropriate to discuss human mental architecture by talking about beliefs, desires, etc., 
‘in the ordinary sense of the terms’. Such a discussion is only likely to be informative and 
substantial once we have clarified—i.e. explicated—the terms. 
The underlying idea here is this: if one is interested in making substantial claims about 
human mental architecture, then one should not seek to ask whether there are beliefs, desires, 
etc., in the ordinary sense of the terms. Rather, one should seek to ask whether there are beliefs, 
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desires, etc. The appropriate tools for making such substantial claims are the explicata, not the 
explicanda. 
It is worth noting that this point would not be that controversial in other domains. For 
example, suppose that a speaker, in an ordinary conversation, intends to make a substantial 
cosmological claim. Then it would be appropriate for her to use the explicated sense of 
“planet”; substantial cosmological claims are not held ransom by speakers’ intuitions about 
(say) “planet” or “Pluto”. Thus, she might appropriately use “Pluto is not a planet” to assert 
that Pluto is not a planet. Alternatively, suppose that another speaker, in an ordinary 
conversation, intends to make a substantial mathematical claim. Then it would be appropriate 
for her to use the mathematic sense of “infinity”; it would be appropriate for her to use “some 
infinite sets are larger than others” to claim that some infinite sets are larger than others. It 
would be irrelevant if one provided evidence that ordinary English speakers intuit, on the basis 
of their understanding of the words involved, that “some infinite sets are larger than others” is 
false. When engaging in a subject matter, one should use appropriate tools. And when making 
substantial claims about human psychology, one should use the appropriate, theoretical terms 
that one has available—such as the explicated, theoretical concepts of belief, desire, etc.  
Objection two.9 “It is illegitimate to appeal to an explication of common-sense mental-
state concepts in order to argue that there are no beliefs, desires, etc. The conclusion 
undermines the initial explication: empty concepts do not make good explicata. So the 
alternative argument fails: it is illegitimate to appeal (7i) in order to argue for eliminative 
materialism.” 
Reply two. For ease of discussion, let us use “descriptive theoretical concepts” to denote 
the theoretical concepts of folk psychology construed so that their extensions are fixed 
descriptively by the laws of folk psychology. Thus, (7i) states that the common-sense mental-
state concepts are to be explicated by the descriptive theoretical concepts. Now, independently 
of any explications, the alternative argument from reference I have provided is committed to 
the claim that the descriptive theoretical concepts are empty. (This is clear given that 
explicating the common-sense mental-state concepts with the descriptive theoretical concepts 
supposedly leads to the conclusion that there are no beliefs, desires, etc.) The objection is that 
the alleged emptiness of the descriptive theoretical concepts undermines (7i).  
Now, it is right that, when deciding between explications, the alleged emptiness of the 
descriptive theoretical concepts should be taken into account. But, contrary to the objection, I 
                                                 
9 Thanks to an anonymous referee for this volume for raising this concern. 
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do not think that the alleged emptiness automatically undermines (7i). The question is whether, 
given the emptiness of the descriptive theoretical concepts, the criteria (I)–(III) favour a 
different explication of the common-sense mental-state concepts whose explicata are non-
empty.10 If there is no such explication, then the conclusion that there are no beliefs, desires, 
etc., stands. However, if there is such an explication, then the appropriate conclusion of the 
argument from reference should instead be that there are beliefs, desires, etc. 
There are two points to make about this. First, either way, the principal aim of the paper 
is unaffected. In light of the above paragraph, we might ask: the assumption of which theory 
of reference can be justified by explication for deployment in the argument from reference? 
Depending on the answer to the question, the appropriate conclusion will either be that beliefs, 
desires, etc., do exist or that they do not exist. But, either way, this concedes the principal point 
that the assumption of a theory of reference in an argument from reference can in principle be 
justified by an explication.  
Second, it does not suffice as an objection simply to note that there might be an 
alternative explication of the common-sense mental-state concepts. The objector would have 
to argue that there are alternative, non-empty explicata for the common-sense mental-state 
concepts, which better satisfy (I)–(III) than the descriptive theoretical concepts. And anyone 
who accepts the initial defence of (7i) is unlikely to accept that there are such alternative 
explicata.  
For example, Churchland (1981: 72–76) offers a number of considerations in favour of 
the conclusion that nothing comes close to satisfying the laws of folk psychology. And, if that 
conclusion is right, then any non-empty explicata will either fail to satisfy criterion (I), which 
demands similarity to explicanda, or criterion (III), which demands fruitfulness. Suppose, first, 
that the non-empty explicata feature in generalisations that underpin explanations of human 
behaviour. Then, for Churchland, those explanations must be quite unlike the everyday 
explanations in which the common-sense mental-state concepts feature—otherwise we would 
expect the common-sense mental-state concepts to likewise be non-empty. As such, for 
Churchland, the non-empty explicata would in this key sense be dissimilar to our common-
sense mental-state concepts and would thus fail to satisfy (I). But if the non-empty explicata 
did not feature in any generalisations that underpin explanations of human behaviour, then they 
would not be fruitful in Carnap’s sense; they would not satisfy criterion (III). Either way, from 
                                                 
10 An alternative interpretation of the objection would be that Carnap’s criteria should be amended, in order to 
rule out empty explicata. As I am assuming Carnap’s criteria, I will not consider this version of the objection here. 
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Churchland’s perspective, it is unlikely that there are non-empty explicata for the common-
sense mental-state concepts that better satisfy (I)–(III) than the descriptive theoretical concepts.  
5. Closing remarks 
An argument from reference is an argument that assumes a theory of reference and seeks to 
establish a substantial philosophical conclusion. MMNS critique arguments from reference in 
three stages. First, they present evidence that there is cross-cultural variation in semantic 
intuitions. Second, they argue that such cross-cultural variations undermines the standard 
methodology for theorising about reference. Third, they argue that, without an acceptable 
methodology for theorising about reference, the assumption of a theory of reference in any 
argument from reference is unjustified. Extant responses to the critique only discuss the first 
and second stages. However, for proponents of arguments from reference, this is insufficient. 
In particular, with respect to Churchland, neither cross-cultural variation in folk semantic 
intuitions, nor the consequence for methodology, should be relevant to whether or not there are 
beliefs, desires, etc. 
I have looked at Churchland’s argument from reference in detail, providing an 
interpretation of that argument from which I have drawn out and motivated a response to the 
third stage of the critique: one can justify the assumption of an appropriate theory of reference 
by appealing to an explication of the relevant common-sense concepts. As explications are 
stipulative, they are independent of MMNS’s methodological concerns for theorising about 
reference. 
 Although I have not argued explicitly for this conclusion here, I take the preceding 
discussion to exemplify a general strategy for responding to MMNS’s critique. Whenever the 
assumption of a theory of reference in an argument from reference can be justified by appeal 
to an explication, the third stage of MMNS’s critique fails. The strategy may not be successful 
for every extant argument from reference; but I see no reason to suppose it can only be 
successful for Churchland.11 It is unclear whether we can say anything general about when this 
strategy for responding to MMNS’s critique will be successful. But this is not surprising. 
Whether an explication is a good explication will depend on the specifics of the case.  
                                                 
11 For example, the strategy can be straightforwardly used to support Andreasen’s (2000) argument that race is 
real. 
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Earlier, I adopted Carnap’s three principal criteria, (I)–(III). Note, however, that these 
criteria are not essential to the general strategy. The key point is that explications are 
stipulative, and thus avoid MMNS’s methodological concerns, not that explications satisfy (I)–
(III). So, for example, one might amend some of the existing criteria (see notes 4 and 10), 
change how they are weighted (see e.g. Kitcher 2008), or add additional criteria (such as 
Carnap’s subordinate criterion of simplicity (1950: 7)). So long as there are appropriate ways 
to stipulate a refinement of a pretheoretic concept for theoretical purposes, one may sometimes 
stipulate that the refined concept be construed in accordance with one or another theory of 
reference; and when one can do that, one is justified in assuming a theory of reference in an 
argument from reference.  
And that is so regardless of whether there is cross-cultural variation in semantic 
intuitions, and regardless of whether such cross-cultural variation would undermine the 
standard methodology for theorising about reference.12 
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